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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
This is a Petition for Review of the Industrial Commission's 
August 10, 1992 Order Denying Petitioner's Motion for Review 
alleging entitlement to workers' compensation benefits sustained as 
a result of an industrial accident• A Petition for Review of that 
Order was timely filed with this Court on September 1, 1992. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Petition for Review 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2) (1988), 35-
1-86 (1988), 63-46b-16 (1988), and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1988); and Rule 
14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S)/STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
There are three substantial issues presented for review: 
(1) whether Mr. Denny's permanent total disability status was 
casually related to his 1983 industrial accident; 
(2) whether the Industrial Commission committed error in 
finding that the Petitioner had failed to satisfy certain statute 
of limitations; and, 
(3) whether the Industrial Commission and the Administrative 
Law Judge abused their discretion in not referring this matter to 
a medical panel to assist in the resolution of the medical 
causation issues. 
The standard of appellate review which is to be applied to the 
resolution of the above issues is one involving "correction of 
error11, since they involve questions of law, and no deference to 
the agency's view of the law is required. Utah Administrative 
1 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) 
(1988). Mor-Flo Industries v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 
1991). Morton International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission. 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Furthermore, in reviewing the proceedings below and the scope 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act, it is important to recognize 
that the Act is to be liberally construed and any doubt as to 
compensation is to be resolved in favor of the Petitioner. State 
Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984). McPhie v. Industrial Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 
1977) . 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE(S)/RULE(S) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1983), Section 35-1-67 
(1983), Section 35-1-77 (1982) and Section 35-1-99 (1981) are the 
determinative statutes in this case. Rule R568-1-9 of the 
Industrial Commission's administrative rules is also applicable. 
They are set forth in full in the Addendum as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Denny seeks review of the Industrial Commission's Order 
denying his Motion for Review wherein he alleged entitlement to 
workers' compensation benefits occasioned by his industrial 
accident. 
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DABkEY & DABNEY, P.C. 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
350 SOUTH 400 EAST — SUITE 202 
S A L T L A K E CITY, U T A H 8 4 1 1 1 TELEPHONE (801) 328-9000 
FACSIMILE (801) 328-9001 
May 19, 1993 
MAY 19 1993 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan, Chief Clerk COURT OF A P P E A L S 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
RE: Clarence W. Denny v. Beaver Creek Coal 
Case No.: 920568-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
Pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, please accept this 
letter as citation to supplemental pertinent and significant authorities which came to Petitioner's 
attention after the Briefs had been filed with the Court in the above-referenced case. 
Specifically, during oral argument, reference was made to the necessity for Medical Panel 
referral based upon the parties' joint request that such referral be had which was denied by both 
the Administrative Law Judge and the Industrial Commission. I am enclosing a copy of an 
Industrial Commission Order of Remand in the case of Tallerico v. Kaiser Steel Corp., Case 
No. 91000569 (March 31, 1993) which resulted in the reversal by the Industrial Commission 
of an Administrative Law Judge's refusal to order a Medical Panel. Specifically, the Industrial 
Commission stated that "In the interest of fairness, we wi}l order a Medical Panel because the 
issue [of medical causation] is at least uncertain." Pages 3-4. A similar Remand should be 
granted in this case for the same reason. 
Enclosed you will find seven copies of this letter as required by Rule 24 (j), including 
copies of the Tallerico decision. I would appreciate it if you would see that copies are 
distributed to those members of the Panel who heard the oral argument on Monday, March 17, 
1993. 
VIRG1NIUS DABNEY 
BARBARA A DABNEY 
FILED 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan, Esq. 
May 19, 1993 
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If you have any questions, please let me know. 
Va 
VIRGI 
VD:rl 
Enclosure 
cc: Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
Steven J. Aeschbacher, Esq. 
Mr. Clarence W. Denny 
File 
c:\files\denny\noonan. 11 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ORDER OF REMAND 
Case No. 91000569 
The Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issues this 
order pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 3 5-1-7 8 and Section 
63~46b-12. 
The 81 year old applicant originally filed an application for 
a hearing in this case on July 1, 1986 claiming permanent total 
disability based on a 1967 low back industrial accident, but no 
hearing was held due to lack of supporting medical evidence. He 
filed a new application on May 23, 1991 which resulted in a hearing 
on October 17, 1991. At the hearing, 115 pages of medical records 
and other documents were identified and admitted into evidence. 
The applicant timely filed this motion for review of the order 
of the administrative law judge (ALJ) in the above referenced 
matter dated November 30, 1992. The order of the ALJ was issued 
after a period of 13 months from the date of the hearing, and 
denied the applicant's claim for permanent total disability 
benefits. 
I. DID THE ALJ ERR BY FAILING TO 
CONSTRUE THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION STATUTE 
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE APPLICANT? 
\ 
The applicant claims that the ALJ erred by failing to construe 
the workers' compensation act liberally in favor of awarding him 
benefits. He asserts that a long history of Utah workers' 
compensation case law supports his view that any doubts raised from 
the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the claim. The 
respondent notes that the Utah courts have required liberal 
construction of the workers' compensation statute and resolution of 
doubts in favor of the applicant in situations where the evidence 
on both sides is equally probative. However, there is no 
requirement that an applicant be awiaxded benefits when he has 
failed to present evidence to show the requisite causal connection 
between his disabling condition and his industrial accident. Large 
v. Industrial Commission, 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988). 
The cases cited by the applicant in support of his motion for 
review relate to the general principles behind the proper 
construction of the workers' compensation statute. The Utah 
Nick Tallerico, * 
* 
Applicant, * 
vs. * 
* 
Kaiser Steel Corporation, * 
Uninsured Employers Fund, and/or* 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, * 
* 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
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Supreme Court has noted that "the right to compensation arises out 
of the relation existing between employer and employee, and that 
the injury arises out of and in the course of employment.11 
Chandler v. Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020, 1021 (Utah 1919). 
Nothing in the analysis of the purposes of the workers' 
compensation act presented in Chandler supports the notion that an 
employee who cannot establish a causal connection between his 
disability and his employment is entitled to benefits. 
The applicant has failed to establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that his 1967 back injury caused his permanent and 
total disability. Thus, the applicant has failed to meet his 
burden of proof and is notwentitled to permanent total disability 
benefits for his 1967 industrial accident. 
II. IS THE ALJ'S DECISION AND ORDER SUPPORTED 
BY ADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW? 
The applicant asserts that the ALJ's Order fails to delineate 
adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. Review of the 
ALJ's Order in light of Adams v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (1991) , indicates that the ALJ made findings sufficient to 
"disclose the steps by which the ultimate factual conclusions, or 
conclusions of mixed fact and law, are reached.11 Milne Truck 
Lines, Inc. v. Public Service Comm'n, 720 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979) cited in Adams, at 20. The ALJ's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are sufficient to show what issues were decided, 
the legal interpretations and applications made, as well as the 
subsidiary factual findings which support his decision. See Adams 
at 21. 
The ALJ's findings are supported \by the record and are 
detailed enough that we can follow his reasoning. The ALJ found 
that there was an industrial accident orrOctober 3, 1967 for which 
only medical benefits were paid. He found that thte applicant 
returned to work and continued "co work through May 28, 197 0. The 
ALJ noted that the medical records generated at the time indicated 
that the treatment of the applicant's back was related to a 
degenerative back condition, not the industrial accident. However, 
our reading of the records shows that the records do not reflect 
the reasons for the degenerative condition in the lumbar spine, or 
that such condition was present in 19 67. Degenerative conditions 
may result from trauma as well as thd^normal aging processes. 
Lastly, the ALJ noted that the medical records in the record 
do not show a causal connection between the applicant's 1967 
industrial injury and his back problems even though the Social 
Security Administration paid him disability benefits from 1970 to 
1975 due to his loto back problems. We agree that there was 
insufficient evidence presented to the ALJ to show that the 
TALLERICO 
ORDER 
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applicant's low back problems were work related. (Order, November 
30, 1992) . 
III. DID THE^LJ ERR BY FAILING TO 
REFER THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL? 
The applicant complains that the ALJ failed to convene a 
medical panel. There was no conflicting medical evidence in the 
record to bring into question the issue of medical causation. A 
reading of the evidence in the record leads one to the preliminary 
conclusion the applicant's back problems are probably due to severe 
degenerative^conditions. However, we, like the ALJ, cannot decide 
that the applicant's backfproblems were caused by the 1967 injury. 
We conclude that the evidence in this regard is uncertain, and thus 
requires referral to a medical panel. We will discuss this issue 
later. 
The medical records exhibit (Applicant's Exhibit #1) shows 
that in 19 67, the applicant reported that he had previous trouble 
with his back in 1952 (Exhibit #1B) . Dr. Milligan noted in June of 
1970 that the applicant was complaining of pain in his low back 
radiating down his legs and pain at the base of his neck (Exhibit 
#1F) . Dr. Milligan diagnosed extensive degenerative changes in the 
applicant's back at that time and opined that his 5 0% impairment 
was "due to far advanced degenerative changes." Id. However, 
there is nothing to show a medical reason for the degeneration. In 
this regard, the records of Carbon Medical Service Associates also 
diagnose "severe degeneration of [the] lumbar spine." Exhibit #1G. 
X-rays obtained in 1985 show degenerative disease with little 
change from the 1980 films. Exhibit #1J. 
The applicant submitted a report brepared by Dr. Hess in 
support of his motion for review. Dr. Hess examined the applicant 
and reviewed his medical records in February 1992, some 25 years 
after the accident and several months after the hearing. Since Dr. 
Hess' report was not a parr of the record below, we cannot now use 
that later submitted report to support a finding of medically 
conflicting evidence to support referral to a medical panel. 
The referral of a disability claim to a medical panel is 
within the discretion of the commission pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-77 
and Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9 (1992) . However, that 
discretion is not unbounded. The controlling statute provides for 
permissive referral. Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P. 2d 1008, 1012 
(Utah 1986). In some cases, such as where the evidence of causal 
connection between the work-related event and the injury is 
uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the case to a 
medical panel may be an abuse of discretion. Champion Home 
Builders v. Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985). In 
the interest of fairness, we will order a medical panel because the 
TALLERICO 
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issue is at least uncertain. 
There is no question that the applicant injured his back in 
1967, and that he was given jsf^ lOO percent disability by the Social 
Security Administration for a back condition. Singe there is no 
requirement that a Social Security disability be work related, we 
must have more information on which to base a decision. The 
records show that at present the applicant shows degenerative 
changes. We are not sure that these changes are totally due to 
age, and it will require medical personnel to tell us to what 
extent the degeneration may be due to age or to trauma from an 
industrially^caused injury. There is thus a question about medical 
causation with regard to
 ftfhe industrial accident and current low 
back problems, and for this reason we feel compelled to order a 
medical panel. 
IV. DID THE ALJ PROPERLY DETERMINE THE ISSUE 
OF THE APPLICANT'S CREDIBILITY? 
The applicant asserts that the ALJ improperly found that the 
applicant and his wife lacked credibility. The applicant further 
asserts that the issue in this case is medical causation and that 
the applicant's credibility or lack thereof, is irrelevant to the 
disposition of that issue. The Commission sees the primary issue 
to be determined in this case is medical causation, and that the 
applicant's credibility may have little to do with the outcome in 
this case. The fact of an industrial accident in 1967 has been 
established. The unanswered question is whether there is a medical 
causation connection to the applicant's current low back problems. 
Generally, medical evidence will establish the medical component. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the Order of the administrative law judge 
dated November 30, 1992 is hereby remanded for referral to a 
TALLERICO 
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medical panel within 45 days. 
-^mjmMMM 
Stephen M. Hadifey 
Chairman ) / 
v. 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner j 
Colleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
sV Certified this Qi day of ^CXACJA 
ATTEST: V-
Patricia O. Ashby 
Commission Secretary u 
1993. 
r-%-
* * % * * w ^ 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Denny filed an application for permanent, total disability 
compensation benefits sustained as the result of an industrial 
injury which occurred in March/April 1983. (R. at 1, 11) . None of 
the parties disputed that Mr. Denny is disabled (R. at 52-53) ; 
however, Respondents alleged that Mr. Denny failed to prove legal 
and medical causation and is thus not entitled to permanent, total 
disability benefits. (R. at 23-24). A formal hearing was held 
before an Administrative Law Judge on December 4, 1990. (R. at 27) . 
Disposition Below 
On March 26, 1992 the Administrative Law Judge held that Mr. 
Denny and his witnesses were not credible, even though no contrary 
witnesses were called to refute their testimony, and that Mr. Denny 
had failed to demonstrate that his symptoms and disability after 
March/April 1983 were the result of pre-existing conditions without 
any contribution from the work activities of March/April 1983. A 
Medical Panel was not appointed to examine Mr. Denny or review his 
medical records. His claim for permanent, total disability 
benefits was dismissed with prejudice for failure to establish 
legal and medical causation. (R. at 51-66, copy attached to 
Addendum as Exhibit B). 
Mr. Denny filed a Motion for Review with the Industrial 
Commission on April 24, 1992. (R. at 67-70). The Industrial 
Commission reversed the finding that Mr. Denny and his witnesses 
were not credible and found that an industrial accident had 
occurred in March 1983; however, the Commission denied his Motion 
3 
for Review finding a lack of legal and medical causation as well as 
a failure to file a claim for compensation within the statute of 
limitations imposed by Utah Code Annotated, Section 3 5-1-99 (1981). 
(R. at 104-116, copy attached to Addendum as Exhibit C) • He 
challenges that final agency action in this Petition for Review. 
Statement of the Facts 
In March/April 1983, Mr. Denny was employed by Beaver Creek 
Coal Co. as a general laborer. (R. at 53) . On the date in 
question, he was driving a trailer, pulling a 1,100 gallon water 
tank, accompanied by a co-worker, Mr. Matt Breniman. His job 
assignment on that date was to water the roadways on the belt line 
to reduce dust. (R. at 53) . On this particular occasion, Mr. 
Denny backed up the trailer to reach the lower belt line. As he 
backed over the fault line, the tilt and rush of water to the rear 
of the trailer pulled the entire trailer back down and under the 
belt line. (R. at 53). 
Mr. Denny's hard hat was knocked off and the lower roller of 
the belt line pushed him down and pinned his body between his legs. 
(R. at 53) . Mr. Breniman was knocked off the vehicle by a cable 
holding up the belt line. When he came and offered assistance to 
the Mr. Denny, he found Mr. Denny pinned over the steering wheel by 
a cable across the mid-section of his back. He did not recall the 
exact date of the accident but fixed it in the general vicinity of 
early 1983. He also recalled that Mr. Denny crawled out of the 
trailer himself. (R. at 104). Mr. Denny testified that his back 
hurt from his head to his belt line and his shoulder was severely 
4 
scratched. (R. at 104). 
While Mr. Denny and Mr. Breniman were discussing the accident, 
Mr. John Alger, the belt-line supervisor, came upon them and was 
told about the accident, and the three men then went to the office 
to fill out an accident report. They did so and Mr. Denny signed 
it. He did not know what happened to the report after that. (R. 
at 105). 
The accident was discussed by the supervisors at a safety 
meeting with the mine employees the next day. Mr. Alger also 
testified that he had made a written report of the accident, 
although one could not now be found in the company records. (R. at 
105) . 
In addition, the accident occurred at the end of Mr. Denny's 
shift for the day. He returned to work the next day, still feeling 
sore. Within 6 months, he began to get pain down his left neck, 
shoulder and arm, but merely endured it and continued to work. (R. 
at 105) . 
In the winter of 1986, Mr. Denny finally sought medical 
treatment and was refereed to Dr. Kirkpatrick in Provo, Utah who 
performed a neck fusion on him on March 13, 1987. (R. at 204-205) . 
In October 1987, the employer told Mr. Denny not to come back to 
work. He did not receive a blue slip or file an unemployment 
claim. (R. at 55). 
A lower back operation also was required, subsequently and it 
was performed in January 1988, by Dr. Kirkpatrick. (R. at 177-
179) . Mr. Denny received short term disability for 13 weeks and 
5 
then long term disability until he began receiving Social Security 
Disability payments. (R. at 57) . 
There was some evidence that in 1976, Mr. Denny suffered a 
hairline fracture of his left shoulder blade when a rock fell on 
it, while he was working at the Soldier Creek Mine. Mr. Denny was 
off work for six months on that occasion, but no surgery was 
performed. (R. at 105). Mr. Denny denied having substantial neck 
or back pain or problems until the March/April 1983 industrial 
accident. (R. at 105). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT(S) 
Mr. Denny sustained a compensable industrial injury in March/ 
April 1983 while in the employ of Beaver Creek Coal Co. The 
Doctors who examined and treated Mr. Denny found that he had 
sustained an industrial injury and that it was responsible, at 
least in part, for his resulting permanent total disability status. 
Respondents did not have their own consultative medical 
examination of Mr. Denny performed nor did they offer any 
conflicting lay or medical testimony or documentation. Although 
the issue of medical causation was raised by the Respondents, the 
Administrative Law Judge did not refer this matter to a Medical 
Panel. 
Mr. Denny was not required to file a claim for compensation 
with the Industrial Commission within three years of the accident 
because he had not at that point incurred any disability. The 
three-year statute of limitations is a statute of repose because it 
6 
improperly required Mr. Denny to file a claim for disability 
benefits before he became disabled, and hence, is unconstitutional 
as violative of the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission's determination that Petitioner did not establish legal 
or medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award 
establishing that fact. In the alternative, this matter should be 
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene 
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS ARE TO BE 
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER. 
Few principles of workers' compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers' compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, supra.; J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980) ; McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v. 
Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. 
7 
Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission. 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra at 1021-1022, 
discussed the proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act 
and the underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be ' liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.7 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
employees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other. should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. (Emphasis added.) 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering his Findings of Fact 
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and Conclusions of Law failed to apply this vital rule of 
construction. Nowhere in his Findings or Conclusions is there any 
evidence of a "liberal construction" or the "resolution of doubt in 
favor of the claim". Rather, the Administrative Law Judge whenever 
any doubt or uncertainty appeared in the record, construed it 
against the injured employee, often finding an issue of credibility 
were none actually existed. 
It is to the credit of the employer and insurance carrier that 
in their response to Mr. Denny's Motion for Review, they conceded 
that credibility "was totally irrelevant to the resolution of the 
claim". (R. at 89). They further joined in asking the Industrial 
Commission to refer this matter to a Medical Panel. (R. at 94). It 
is also to the Respondent Industrial Commission's credit that the 
credibility question was reversed by it on review. 
Nevertheless, the "humane and beneficent purposes" of the Act 
must be kept in mind in reviewing the final Order of the Industrial 
Commission, generally, and should have been applied further by the 
Industrial Commission when it reviewed the remaining issues in Mr. 
Denny's claim. 
II 
THE PETITIONER'S PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY STATUS IS 
CAUSALLY RELATED TO HIS 1983 INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
The evidence that Mr. Denny suffered an industrial injury in 
1983 was overwhelming and largely unrefuted other than by innuendo. 
The Industrial Commission made a specific finding that there was an 
industrial accident in 1983, but based their argument that a 
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compensable injury did not occur on that date because Mr. Denny 
walked 3/5's of a mile after the accident, returned to work the 
next day and did not seek significant medical attention for several 
years thereafter. This argument begs the question and fails to 
apply clearly delineated standards as to what constitutes a 
"compensable injury." There is no requirement in Utah law that an 
industrial accident result in immediate and debilitating injury in 
order for it to be "compensable." 
In order to establish that he has suffered a compensable 
injury under the Workers' Compensation Act, Mr. Denny need only 
show that the injury must have occurred by accident; and there must 
be a causal connection between the injury and the claimant's 
employment activities. Sisco Hilte v. Industrial Commission, 766 
P.2d 1089, 190 (Utah App. 1988). 
In the landmark case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 
P. 2d 15 (Utah 1986), the Supreme Court defined what constitutes an 
accident under Workers' Compensation Act. The Court held as 
follows: 
For purposes of worker's compensation, the key 
requirement of an 'accident' is that the occurrence be 
unanticipated, unplanned and unintended; where either 
cause of injury or result of exertion is different from 
what would normally be expected to occur, occurrence is 
unplanned, unforeseen, and unintended and, thus, by 
'accident'. Id. at 21. 
Mr. Denny testified that he suffered an industrial accident 
when he injured himself and the Industrial Commission has ruled 
that "there is now no issue as to memory, truthfulness, ability to 
observe, or bias among others...." (R. at 108). Petitioner's 
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version of the events was supported by co-workers and was never 
rebutted by contrary testimonial or documentary evidence. As such, 
the evidence is overwhelming that in 1983, Mr. Denny suffered an 
industrial accident and the only dispute raised is whether it is 
"compensable." 
First, Mr. Denny does not deny that he had pre-existing back 
injuries; however, just because a person suffers a pre-existing 
condition, he or she is not disqualified from obtaining 
compensation. "Compensation is not dependant on the state of an 
employee's health or his freedom from constitutional weakness or 
latent tendency." Denver v. Hansen, 650 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Colo. 
App., 1982). The clear law of this state is that "the aggravation 
or lighting up of a preexisting disease by an industrial accident 
is compensable...." Powers v. Industrial Commission, 427 P. 2d 740, 
743 (Utah 1967) (quoted with approval in Allen, id.). 
Second, there was no medical evidence offered at the hearing 
which suggested that Mr. Denny's injuries were not at least 
partially the result of the industrial accident. In fact, Dr. 
Kirkpatrick after determining that Mr. Denny had a 4 5% permanent, 
partial impairment stated that his disability "is at least 
partially related to his industrial accident". (R. at 149). No 
conflicting medical evidence exists in the record to refute that 
conclusion. The Industrial Commission cannot summarily ignore or 
arbitrarily discount competent, uncontradicted evidence without 
some rational basis for doing so. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Industrial 
Commission.. 709 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1985). Frito-Lay, Inc. v. Jacobs, 
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689 P.2d 1335 (Utah 1984). 
Third, even the Respondent employer and insurance carrier 
joined in arguing that the matter should be referred to a medical 
panel, but the Administrative Law Judge and the Commission 
summarily refused to do so. Such summary conclusions do not 
constitute proper fact-finding. In the recent case of Adams v. 
Board of Review. 821 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1991), the Court stated as 
follows: 
While the purported 'Findings of Fact' written by 
the A.L.J, contain an informative summary of the evidence 
presented, such a rehearsal of contradictory evidence 
does not constitute findings of fact. In order for a 
finding to truly constitute a 'finding of fact,' it must 
indicate what the A.L.J, determines in fact occurred.... 
The evidence did not merely indicate two possible 
versions of a fact whereby we could conclude that the 
denial of benefits necessarily indicates that the 
Commission accepted one version over another. The 
evidence shows several possible configurations and 
degrees of injury and/or disease, if any, and the causes, 
if any, thereby creating a matrix of possible factual 
findings. A mere summary of the conflicting evidence in 
this case therefore does not give a clear indication of 
the A.L.J.'s or the Commission's view as to what in fact 
occurred. Since we cannot even determine why the 
Commission found there was no causation shown, we clearly 
cannot assume that the Commission actually made any of 
the possible subsidiary findings. The findings are 
therefore inadequate. Xd. at 20. 
Although none of the parties dispute that Mr. Denny is 
permanently and totally disabled, neither the Administrative Law 
Judge nor the Industrial Commission explain how they reached that 
decision. Significantly, even the employer and its insurance 
carrier agreed that "The Decision and Order are not truly supported 
by adequate findings based on the entire record". (R. at 90). 
The Industrial Commission's as well as the Administrative Law 
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Judge7s purported Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
should at a minimum be vacated and remanded with instructions to 
enter a new Order with detailed and subsidiary facts to disclose 
the steps by which the ultimate conclusion was reached. Failure to 
do so, denies Petitioner the ability to marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and show that it is not substantial. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63, 67-68 (Utah App. 
1989) . 
Ill 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COMMITTED ERROR IN FINDING THAT 
THE PETITIONER HAD FAILED TO SATISFY A THREE-YEAR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATION FOR FILING A CLAIM. 
In 1983 Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981) provided 
that an employee was required to give notice of his accident and 
injury to the employer within one year from the date of the 
accident, and file a claim for compensation within three years from 
the date of the accident. The statute provided that failure to 
give notice or file a claim within those time periods wholly barred 
the right to compensation. 
The Industrial Commission in this case found that although Mr. 
Denny had satisfied the requirement for the giving of notice to his 
employer within one year, had failed to 
. . . file a claim for compensation until some five and 
one/half years after his injury. This was outside the 
three year statue of limitations imposed for compensation 
claims by U.C.A. 35-1-99, and temporary total 
compensation, temporary partial compensation, and 
permanent partial compensation requested by the applicant 
for the 1983 injury must be denied under this statute. 
There is, however, no bar to medical expense claims under 
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this statute, and the issue of permanent total 
compensation remains open. (R. at 111). 
Significantly, the Industrial Commission acknowledged that 
they had "jurisdiction" and that there was no statute of 
limitations for permanent total disability compensation. Since, as 
argued herein, Mr. Denny can establish, or at least a medical panel 
should be convened to establish, medical causation that his 
permanent, total disability status is in part the result of his 
1983 industrial accident, he may at a minimum be entitled to 
permanent, total disability benefits. 
The only issue remaining here is whether he is entitled to 
benefits for temporary total, temporary partial, and permanent 
partial compensation, in the event that his permanent, total 
disability claim is not established. The requirement, if there is 
one, allegedly contained in Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-99 
(1981) that such claims must be filed within three years is a 
statute of repose and violates the Open Courts provisions of the 
Utah Constitution. See, e. g. , Wrolstad v. Industrial Commission, 
786 P.2d 243 (Utah 1990), and Velarde v. Industrial Commission, 831 
P.2d 123 (Utah App. 1992) 
The problem with the three year statue of repose is that it 
fails to take into account the cumulative and increasing nature of 
Mr. Denny's injuries which ultimately ripened into a valid claim 
for compensation more than three years after his industrial 
accident occurred. It is undisputed by the parties that following 
the accident, Mr. Denny continued to work for 4 and one/half years. 
Under the Industrial Commission's logic, since he did not file a 
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claim for compensation within three years, which was before his 
claim for compensation matured, it is now barred. This Court has 
declared such statutes of repose as unconstitutional. See 
Wrolstad, supra. and Velarde, supra. 
In Wrolstad, supra, at 245, this Court acknowledged that "a 
person can't file an occupational disease claim for a disease he 
does not know he has." Likewise, Petitioner here could not file 
his claim within three years of the date of the accident as 
provided by the statute because he did not know then the extent or 
nature of his injuries. It is precisely that fact which makes the 
statute one of repose and not limitation. 
Professor Larson cites the clear problems and fundamental 
unfairness that such a repose statute creates: 
The classic illustration is that of the apparently 
trivial accident that matures into a disabling injury 
after the claim period has expired. A workman is struck 
in the eye by a metal chip, but both he and the company 
doctors dismiss the accident as a petty one, and of 
course no claim is made, since there is no present injury 
or disability. Eighteen months later a cataract develops 
as the direct result of the accident. If the statute 
bars claims filed more than one year after the 
'accident,' and if the court applies the statutory 
language with medieval literalism, the workman can never 
collect for the injury no matter how diligent he is: he 
cannot claim during the year because no compensable 
injury exists; he cannot claim after the year, because 
the statute runs from the accident. 2B Larson, Workmen's 
Compensation Law, Section 78.42(a), page 15-262 (1989). 
* * * 
Limitations periods are of course constitutional in 
general, but is such a period valid when it begins to run 
before a claim exists and assumes to destroy it before it 
is born? Is it not elementary that the running of the 
period must be related to the time of acquisition of the 
enforceable right, rather that of some event which may or 
may not coincide with that acquisition? Suppose a 
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statute were passed which said than, in the event of any 
highway collision, suit must be commenced within two 
years of the last presidential election. This is in no 
way any sillier or more oppressive than a statute which 
says that a man who gets a bit of grime in his eye in 
1960 which causes only slight irritation must bring a 
claim for blindness within one year of that time— 
blindness that does not develop until 1962. 2B Larson, 
Workmen's Compensation Law. Section 78.42(e), page 15-
272.5 (1989). 
Once medical causation is established (and we believe it has 
been so established by this record), Mr. Denny should be entitled 
to permanent, total disability compensation. In the event Mr. 
Denny's lifetime claim is not accepted, he still has a valid claim 
for temporary total, temporary partial and permanent partial 
benefits since the 3-year statute of limitations for the filing of 
a claim is an unconstitutional statute of repose. 
IV 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION IN NOT REFERRING THIS MATTER TO 
A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE RESOLUTION OF THE 
MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUES, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1982) reads as follows: 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by 
accident, or for death, arising out of or in the course 
of employment, and if the employer or its insurance 
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed 
by the commission.... 
There is no question that the employer and insurance carrier 
denied liability as provided in the statute. Despite the fact that 
there were significant medical issues involved and both Mr. Denny 
and the Employer and its Insurance Carrier requested that this 
matter be referred to a medical panel, the Industrial Commission in 
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its Order Denying Motion for Review stated: 
There is no basis on which to refer this case to a 
medical panel. We have been shown no conflicting medical 
reports, and the applicant has failed to carry his burden 
of persuasion. (R. at 113) . 
There is no dispute that this case involved "significant 
medical issues". The question concerning the contribution of the 
1983 industrial accident to Mr. Denny's permanent, total disability 
status is the primary issue in this case. Utah Industrial 
Commission Rule R568-1-9 governing the "necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel" provided in relevant part: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole 
person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000.... See Addendum, Exhibit A. 
The Rule mandatorily requires that a panel "will" be used when 
"one or more significant medical issues may be involved". Although 
the Rule further provides that "Generally a significant medical 
issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports", the Rule only 
states that such is the case "generally" and not that such 
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conflicting reports are always required in order for there to be 
"significant medical issues". 
There were no conflicting medical reports in this case simply 
because the Respondents chose not to present any. They did, 
however, join in requesting that this matter be referred to a 
medical panel. The need for a medical panel should not be avoided 
by a parties' failure or decision not to conduct their own 
consultative medical examination. In addition, in this case, Mr. 
Denny's own medical reports add some confusion to the issue because 
of Dr. Kirkpatrick's referral to a nonexistent 1987 industrial 
accident rather than the one in 1983. It is for these reasons 
that referral to a medical panel was necessary and the failure to 
do so was more than an abuse of discretion - it was plain error. 
See Lipman v. Industrial Commission, supra and Schmidt v. 
Industrial Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980) interpreting the 
former Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1953) which made 
referrals to medical panels mandatory in cases of denied liability. 
Although reference to a medical panel under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1982) is discretionary, that discretion 
is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the Commission's 
own Rules and Regulations (Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9). The failure 
to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such referral is 
requested by all parties and is necessary to resolve medical 
causation issues is plain error. "In some cases, such as where the 
evidence of causal connection between the work-related event and 
the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer the 
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case to a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion." Champion 
Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 
1985). See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986). 
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and the Applicant's permanent, total disability, if not 
clear, was at least uncertain and failure to refer the matter to a 
medical panel was error. The Order Denying Motion for Review 
should at the least be reversed and the matter remanded with 
directions to refer the matter to a medical panel since failure to 
do was in direct conflict with Industrial Commission practice and 
rule. It was also contrary to all parties' positions. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the 
Industrial Commission erred when it entered its August 10, 1992 
Order dismissing Mr. Denny's claim for permanent, total disability 
benefits for lack of legal and medical causation as well as the 
failure to file a claim for compensation within three years. The 
uncontroverted evidence submitted to the Industrial Commission 
supports the finding that he sustained a significant injury due to 
his 1983 industrial accident, and is permanently, totally disabled 
due to that injury. To the extent there is any doubt or confusion 
as to medical causation, it was error for the Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission not to convene a medical panel. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court 
release the final agency action, and remand with instructions to 
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either award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and 
medical evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a 
medical panel. 
DATED this 12th day of November/ 1992 
DABNEY & DABNEVi t>.c, 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Petitioner were mailed, postage prepaid, on this 12th day 
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Utah Court of Appeals (1 original & 7 copies) 
400 Midtown Plaza 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
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Benjamin A. Sims, Esq. (2 copies) 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 South 300 East 
Post Office Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq, (2 copies) 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Robert J. Shaugnessy, Esq. (2 copies) 
1800 South West Temple Suite 407 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Mr. Clarence W. Denny 
P.O. Box 228 
Wellington, Utah 84542 
File 
I 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A; Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-66 (1983) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1983) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1982) 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-99 (1981) 
Utah Administrative Code R568-1-9. 
EXHIBIT B; Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
(March 26, 1992). 
EXHIBIT C: Order Denying Motion for Review (August 10, 1992). 
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35-1-66. Permanent partial disability — Scale of payments. The commission 
#ay make a permanent partial disability award at any time prior to eight years 
after the date of injury to an employee whose physical condition resulting from 
such injury is not finally healed and fixed eight years after the date of injury and 
who files an application for such purpose prior to the expiration of such eight-year 
period. 
In no case shall the weekly payments continue after the disability ends, or the 
death of the injured person. 
In the case of the following injuries the compensation shall be 66 %% of that 
employee's average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than a 
maximum of 66 %% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 for a dependent 
spouse and $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum 
of four such dependent children, but not to exceed 66 %% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week, to be paid weekly for the number 
of weeks stated against such injuries respectively, and shall be in addition to the 
compensation provided for temporary total disability and temporary partial dis-
ability, to wit: 
For the loss of: Number of Weeks 
lA) Upper extremity 
(1) Arm 
(a) Arm and shoulder (forequarter amputation) .218 
(b) Arm at shoulder joint, or above deltoid insertion 187 
(c) Arm between deltoid insertion and elbow joint, at elbow joint, or below 
elbow joint proximal to insertion of biceps tendon 178 
(d) Forearm below elbow joint distal to insertion of biceps tendon 168 
(2) Hand 
(a) At wrist or midcarpal or midmetacarpal amputation 168 
(b) All fingers except thumb at metacarpophalangeal joints 101 
(3) Thumb 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of carpometacarpal 
bone 67 
(b) At interphalangeal joint 50 
(4) Index finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 42 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint 34 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint 18 
For the loss of: Number of Week8 
(5) Middle finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone 3. 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint " 27 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint ] ^ 
(6) Ring finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone ^ 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint ^ 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint -
 8 
(7) Little finger 
(a) At metacarpophalangeal joint or with resection of metacarpal bone g 
(b) At proximal interphalangeal joint
 6 
(c) At distal interphalangeal joint
 4 
(B) Lower extremity 
(1) Leg 
(a) Hemipelvectomy (leg, hip and pelvis) x& 
(b) Leg at hip joint or three inches or less below tuberosity of ischium 
•/•••»• 125 
(c) Leg above knee with functional stump, at knee joint or Gritti-Stokes 
amputation or below knee with short stump (three inches or less 
below intercondylar notch) 112 
(d) Leg below knee with functional stump g8 
(2) Foot 
(a) Foot at ankle 88 
(b) Foot partial amputation (Chopart's) 66 
(c) Foot midmetatarsal amputation 44 
(3) Toes 
(a) Great toe 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone 26 
(ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint [ ig 
(iii) At interphalangeal joint " 12 
(b) Lesser toe (2nd — 5th) 
(i) With resection of metatarsal bone
 4 (ii) At metatarsophalangeal joint [ 3 
(iii) At proximal interphalangeal joint 2 
(iv) At distal interphalangeal joint \ 
(c) All toes at metatarsophalangeal joints 26 
(4) Miscellaneous 
(a) One eye by enucleation .120 
(b) Total blindness of one eye JOQ 
(c) Total loss of binaural hearing 100 
(C) Permanent and complete loss of use shall be deemed equivalent to loss of 
the member. Partial loss or partial loss of use shall be a percentage of the complete 
loss or loss of use of the member. This paragraph, however, shall not apply to the 
items listed (B) (4). 
Permanent hearing loss caused by accident shall be determined and paid as fol-
lows: 
"Loss of hearing" is defined as the binaural hearing loss measured in decibels 
with frequencies of 500,10002 ami 20002 and 3000 cycles per second (cps) using pure 
tone air conduction audiometric instruments (ASA 1051) (ANSI 1969) approved by 
nationally recognized authorities in the field of measurement of hearing impair-
ment. Reduction of hearing ability in frequencies above 2006 3000 cycles per second 
shall not be considered in determining compensable disability. If the average deci-
bel loss at 500j 1000, 2000, and 3000 cycles per second ]s .25 deciFelsor less, usually 
no hearing impairment exists. 
"Presbycusis" is defined as hearing loss common to persons of advanced age and 
s considered to be due to general environment rather than industrial conditions. 
In measuring hearing loss, a medical panel of medical and paramedical profcs-
*&** professionals appointed by the commission shall measure the loss in each ear 
it the three four frequencies 500, 10002 *nd 2000i and 3000 cycles per second which 
shall be added together and divided by three four to determine the average decibel 
oss. ?e allow for presbycusis, there shall be deducted from the average decibel 
ess -Vt a decibel for eaeh year of the employee's age ever forty at the time ef the 
accident: To determine the percentage of hearing loss in each ear, (after deduction 
>f the less m decibels for presbycusis) the average decibel loss for each decibel 
Df loss exceeding fifteen 25 decibels shall be multiplied by 1 xh% up to the maxi-
mum of 100% which is reached at 82 92 decibels. 
Binaural hearing loss is determined by multiplying the percentage of hearing loss 
in the better ear by five, then adding the percentage of hearing loss in the poorer 
ear and dividing by six. The resulting figure is the percentage of binaural hearing 
loss. Compensation for permanent partial disability for binaural hearing loss shall 
be determined by multiplying the percentage of binaural hearing loss by 100 weeks 
of compensation benefits as provided in this chapter. Where an employee files one 
or more claims for hearing loss the percentage of hearing loss previously found 
to exist shall be deducted from any subsequent award by the commission. In no 
event shall compensation benefits be paid for total or 100% binaural hearing loss 
exceeding 100 weeks of compensation benefits. 
For any other disfigurement or the loss of bodily function not otherwise provided 
for herein, such period of compensation as the commission' shall deem equitable 
and in proportion as near as may be to compensation for specific loss as set forth 
in the schedule in this section but not exceeding in any case 312 weeks, which shall 
be considered the period of compensation for permanent total losp of bodily func-
tion. 
The amounts specified in this section are all subject to the limitations as to the 
maximum weekly amount payable as specified in this section, and in no event shall 
more than a maximum of 66 %% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury for a total of 312 weeks in compensation be required to be paid. 
35-1-67. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Vocational 
rehabilitation — Procedure and payments. In cases of permanent total disability 
the employee shall receive 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage 
at the time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of eighteen 18 years, up to a maximum of four saeh dependent minor children 
not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, 
but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury 
per week. However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or 
its insurance carrier be required to pay saeh weekly compensation payments for 
more than 312 weeksj and provided further, that a. A finding by the commission 
of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final until such 
time as the following proceedings have been had: Where If the employee has tenta-
tively been found to be permanently and totally disabled, it shall be mandatory 
that the industrial commission of Utah refer saeh the employee to the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education for rehabilitation 
training and it shall be the duty of the commission to order paid to sueh the voca-
tional rehabilitation division, out of the second injury fund provided for by flection 
subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training 
of stteh the employee; the rehabilitation and training of 9«eh the employee shall 
generally follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the division of 
vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education certifies to the indus-
trial commission of Utah a«4 in writing that s&tb the employee has fully 
co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilitation in its efforts to rehabili-
tate him, and in the opinion of the division the employee may not be rehabilitated, 
theft the commission shall order that there be paid to 9t*eh the employee weekly 
benefits at the rate of 66 % % of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, 
but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the 
time of the injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus 
$5 for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age 
of eighteen 18 years, up to a maximum of four st*eh dependent minor children not 
to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but 
lot to exceed 85% of the state average weekly wage at the fime of the injury per 
veek out of the second injury fund provided for by section subsection 35-1-68 (1), 
'or such period of time beginning with the time that the payments: fas in this sec-
Jon provided^ to be made by the employer or its insurance carrier terminate and 
3nding with the death of the employee. No employee; however, shall be entitled 
:o any such benefits if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of voca-
tional rehabilitation as set forth herein under this section. 
All persons who are permanently and totally disabled and entitled to benefits 
from the second injury fund designated m subsection ft) ef section 35-1-68 under 
subsection 35-1-68 (1), including those injured prior to March 6, 1949, shall receive 
not less than $109 $110 per week when paid only by the second injury fund, or 
when combined with compensation payments of the employer or the insurance car-
rier. The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of the voca-
tional training of the employee, certify to the industrial commission of Utah the 
work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon the commission shall, 
after notice to the employer and an opportunity to be heard, determine whether 
che employee has, notwithstanding such rehabilitation, sustained a loss of bodily 
function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both arms, or 
both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, sfeaH constitute consti-
tutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to the provisions 
of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total disability shall be is 
required in sseh those instances; «*. In all other cases; however, frnd where there 
has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some loss of bodily function, 
the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay compen-
sation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in sections 
35-1-65, 35 1-66 and this section, including loss of function, in excess of 85% of 
the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Discretionary authority of commission to refer 
case — Findings and reports — Objections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or for death 
arising out of or in the course of employment, and where the employer or insurance 
carrier denies liability, the commission may refer the medical aspects of the case 
to a medical panel appointed by the commission and having the qualifications gen-
erally applicable to the medical panel set forth in section 35-2-56. The medical 
panel shall then make such study, take such X-rays and perform such tests, includ-
ing post-mortem examinations where authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine and thereafter make a report in writing to the commission in a form 
prescribed by the commission, and also make such additional findings as the com-
mission may require. The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the 
report of the panel to the applicant, the employer and the insurance carrier by 
registered mail with return receipt requested. Within fifteen days after such report 
is deposited in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer or the 
insurance carrier may file with the commission objections in writing thereto. If 
no objections are so filed within such period, the report shall be deemed admitted 
in evidence and the commission may base its finding and decision on the report 
of the panel, but shall not be bound by such report if there is other substantial 
conflicting evidence in the case which supports a contrary finding by the commis-
sion. If objections to such report are filed the commission may set the case for 
hearing to determine the facts and issues involved, and at such hearing any party 
so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman of the medical panel 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good cause 
shown the commission may order other members of the panel, with or without the 
chairman, to be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
Upon such hearing the written report of the panel may be received as an exhibit 
but shall not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained 
by the testimony admitted. The expenses of such study and report by the medical 
panel and of their appearance before the commission shall be paid out of the fund 
provided for by section 35-1-68. 
35-1-99* Notice of injury and claim for compensation — Limitation of 
action — Tolling period for filing claim. When an employee claiming to have 
suffered an injury in the service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer 
0f the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and of the nature 
of the same, within 48 hours, when possible, or fails to report for medical treatment 
within said time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%; pro-
vided, that knowledge of such injury obtained from any source on the part of such 
employer, his managing agent, superintendent, foreman or other person in author-
ity, or knowledge of any assertion by the injured sufficient to afford an opportunity 
to the employer to make an investigation into the facts and to provide medical 
treatment shall be equivalent to such notice; and no defect or inaccuracy therein 
shall subject the claimant to such reduction, if there was no intention to mislead 
or prejudice the employer in making his defense, and the employer was not, in fact, 
so misled or prejudiced thereby. If no notice of the accident and injury is given 
to the employer within one year from the date of the accident, the right to compen-
sation shall be wholly barred. If no claim for compensation is filed with the indus-
trial commission within three years from the date of the accident or the date of 
the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation shall be wholly 
barred; provided, however, that the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury 
with the industrial commission, the employer or its insurance carrier, together with 
the payment of any compensation benefit or the furnishing of medical treatment 
by the employer or an insurance carrier, shall toll the period for filing such claim 
until the employer or its carrier notifies the industrial commission and employee, 
in writing, of its denial of liability or further liability, as the case may be, for 
the industrial accident or injury, with instructions upon said notification of denial 
to the employee to contact the industrial commission for further advice or assist-
ance to preserve or protect the employee's rights; and provided further, that the 
said claim for compensation in any event must be filed within 8 years from the 
date of the accident. 
R568-1-9 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel, 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the commission adopts the 
following guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must be 
shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 
days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. 
Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting medical 
evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a 
hearing, re-submit the new evidence to the panel for 
consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of 
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation 
pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a 
report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to 
give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be 
non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at the 
hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative 
Law Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
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SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
HEARING: Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 3 00 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 
December 4, 1990, at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said 
hearing pursuant to Order and Notice of the 
Commission. 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
The Honorable Donald L. 
Judge. 
George, Administrative Law 
The applicant was present'1* and 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney at Law, 
represented by 
The defendant employer, Beaver Creek Coal Company 
and its insurer, Cigna Insurance were represented 
by Robert J. Shaughnessy, Attorney. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
its administrator, Erie V. Boorman, Attorney. 
An Application for Hearing requesting medical expenses, 
temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, travel 
expenses, interest and attorney's fees was filed with the 
Industrial Commission of Utah on September 26, 1988, wherein the 
applicant, Clarence W. Denny, alleges that, he sustained an injury 
by accident arising out of or in the course of his employment with 
the defendant employer, Beaver Creek Coal Company, on March 6, 
1987. That application was assigned case number 88000837, a copy 
was sent to the defendant employer and an Answer thereto was timely 
filed. However, by letter dated October 31/ 1988, the Industrial 
Commission advised applicants counsel that no medical evidence or 
Employer7s First Report of Injury had been received to substantiate 
the allegations made the in application for hearing, and therefore 
no hearing would be scheduled until that documentation had been 
received. By letter dated December 5, 1988, the Industrial 
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Commission again requested the supporting documentation, and 
advised that if it was not received within 30 days, the matter 
would be dismissed. No documentation or medical records being 
received, an Order of Dismissal without prejudice was entered on 
January 26, 1989. Further, at this hearing, applicants counsel 
stated that there was not a 1987 industrial accident. 
A document entitled "Amended" Application for Hearing 
requesting medical expenses, temporary total compensation, 
temporary partial compensation, permanent partial compensation, 
permanent total compensation, travel expenses, reimbursement of 
paid expenses, interest, attorney's fees, rehabilitation benefits, 
and untimely E-l filing/mailing was filed with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah on May 22, 1990, wherein the applicant alleges 
that he sustained an injury by accident arising out of or in the 
course of his employment with the defendant employer in Mar/Apr, 
1983, some 4 years prior to the date alleged in the first case, 
88000837. This "Amended" Application was assigned case number 
90001060, a copy was sent to the defendant employer/insurer, an 
Answer thereto was timely filed and accordingly, this matter was 
scheduled for hearing before the Industrial Commission of Utah on 
December 4, 1990. 
It is undisputed that the applicant/s date of birth is 
September 16, 1935, and his social security number is 528-52-6788; 
that at the time of the alleged industrial accident of March/April, 
1983, the applicant was married, had no dependent children, and was 
earning sufficient to entitle him to the maximum in workers 
compensation benefits. 
The defendant employer's Motion to Dismiss the 1983 accident 
was taken under advisement. 
The issues to be resolved by the Administrative Law Judge, as 
described by Applicant's counsel were: 
1. The 1, 3 and 6 year statutes of limitations raised by the 
defendant employer. 
2. If an industrial accident is found, the applicant's 
entitlement to permanent and total disability considering his 45% 
whole person impairments, all or a majority of which the applicant 
attributes to this alleged industrial accident, combined with the 
applicant's already having been awarded social security disability 
compensation, and his age, education and work history, he is a 
candidate for permanent and total disability. 
The defendant employer and insurer did not dispute that the 
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applicant was probably totally disabled, but attributed all to pre-
existing conditions, and none to this alleged industrial accident. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund also questioned whether this 
alleged industrial accident had any connection with the applicant's 
likely permanent total disability given the distant filing of the 
claim. 
A single exhibit was marked as Plaintiff's #1, consisting of 
a 219 page compilation of medical and other documentation, which 
was received without objection, although the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund reserved the right to object after it had reviewed those 
records. 
It was then stipulated by all parties that the applicant was 
permanently and totally disabled. 
On direct examination, the applicant stated that he had gone 
to work for the defendant employer as a general laborer 
approximately 1 year before this alleged industrial accident. On 
the date of the accident, on or about March or April, 1983 the 
applicant was engaged in watering the roadways on the belt lines 
with a tractor pulling an 1,100 gallon water tank, accompanied by 
co-worker, Matt Breniman. The applicant stated that he had to back 
in to water the lower belt area because thete was nowhere to turn 
around. As he backed the trailer over the fault line, the tilt and 
rush of water to the rear of the trailer pulled the tractor back 
down and under the belt line. The applicant stated that he 
remembered his hat being knocked off, he thought, by the lower 
roller which also pushed him down and pinned his body between his 
legs. He then stated that Breniman came up and asked him if he was 
alright and helped him out. After some other general information 
about the tractor and the belt, the applicant then stated that he 
crawled out himself and stood up without any help. The applicant 
then stated that his back hurt, but not so that he couldn't walk. 
He stated that his left shoulder had soms scratches on it that hurt 
worse than anything. He described his backache as extending from 
his head to his belt line. The applicant thinks that Breniman 
jumped off the tractor when it was hauled down backwards. 
Immediately after the accident those 2 were discussing it when Mr. 
Alger, the belt boss, walked up and all 3 talked about it. The 3 
men then proceeded to walk out to the office to fill out a report, 
and the applicant stated that Dan James was also there. The 
applicant stated that John Alger filled out ;the report and he (the 
applicant) signed it. The applicant stated that he did not know 
what happened to the report from there on. It was the end of the 
applicant's shift for that day. The applicant returned to work the 
next day, and continued to work from there on. He stated that he 
was sore only. Then he began to get a pain down his left neck, 
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shoulder and arm, first noticed about 6 months later. However, 
since the applicant stated that he had been told that he could take 
a lot of pain, he didn't do anything about it until 2 or 3 years 
later. At that time, about the winter of 1986, he went to a Dr. 
Jackson in Provo who referred him to Dr. Kirkpatrick who did a neck 
fusion on March 12, 1987. After the operation, the applicant was 
off till July, 1987, returned to work until October 28, 1987, when 
Dr. Kirkpatrick performed a 2nd neck operation. The applicant then 
had a lower back operation in January, 1988, again by Dr. 
Kirkpatrick. 
On cross-examination by the defendant employer/insurer, the 
applicant admitted that he was not sure of the date of this 
occurrence and it could have been as early as 1982. During the 3 
1/2 years before the applicant went to Dr. Jackson, he had no 
medical treatment and only took Anacin occasionally. He lost no 
time from work on account of his back, although he may have for 
other reasons. Two or three months before he went to see Dr. 
Jackson, his complaint was that he had pain in his neck that 
radiated into his shoulder, down his arm and his hands tingled. 
The applicant indicated that the pain got worse when he moved his 
neck. He also stated that it would come and go. The applicant 
denied having had any pains in his back prior to this industrial 
accident, although he admitted that he had regular backaches. 
The defendant employer's counsel then read this excerpt from 
Dr. Kirkpatrick's letter of April 28, 1989 (page 24 of A-l) : "as 
you well know, Mr. Denny is a 54 year old right handed coal miner 
from Wellington, whom I have treated for the past several years 
because of progressively severe cervical and lumbar spondylosis 
causing neck pain, back pain, and dysfunction of all four limbs. 
His symptoms apparently started back in 1982 when he was involved 
in a severe mining accident. He has had some degree of neck pain 
going back even longer than that or for 12 years. 
The applicant said that there must have been some 
misunderstanding between he and the doctor. When asked to explain 
the reference to 12 years prior to 1982, the applicant at first 
stated that he could not, and then denied ever having said that to 
Dr. Kirkpatrick. The applicant stated that the main source of his 
pain in 1987 was his neck, presently it was a toss up between his 
cervical and lumbar areas, sometimes one and sometimes the other. 
The applicant acknowledged having had a conversation with Dr. 
Kirkpatrick about his having a progressive, degenerative, disease 
that extended from his tailbone to his neck. The applicant also 
acknowledged Dr. Kirkpatrick's pragmatic recommendation that he 
quit working, take medication and live with the symptoms. 
Defendant employer's counsel then turned to Dr. Kirkpatrick's 
letter of February 27, 1989, and quoted, "I would estimate that his 
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[the applicant's] disability is at least partially related to his 
industrial injury of March 6, 1987, although some of his symptoms 
and problems certainly predate this event11. The applicant at first 
stated that he didn't know how that date got in there, then offered 
that he had run into a screen on that date, which he stated he told 
his supervisor about, but it was not reported. He then stated that 
this was another example of a misunderstanding on dates between he 
and Dr. Kirkpatrick. He then stated that any reference by Dr. 
Kirkpatrick to an incident in March of 1987 was simply incorrect. 
The applicant recited that he first saw Dr. Kirkpatrick in 
December, 1986. Dr. Kirkpatrick's letter of March 11, 1987, (A-l, 
page 43) was correct, said the applicant, except for the doctor's 
statement about the applicant having neck pain for about 12 years 
previous, and the doctor's other statement that this industrial 
accident occurred 3 years previous, the applicant contending it was 
4 years. The applicant admitted that the had a rock drop on his 
left shoulder sometime previous to this employ, but stated that it 
was a fractured shoulder blade and didn't involve his neck. This 
reportedly occurred while he was working at the Soldier Creek Mine. 
The applicant did not remember mentioning any prior rock 
incident in connection with his application for social security 
disability benefits. 
As to heart problems, the applicant said that there was a 
suspicion of such but it was ultimately determined that there was 
not a problem. The applicant further stated that he sees a doctor 
about once a year, either Dr. Morgan or Dr. Gaufin. The purpose in 
seeing these doctors is because he is always in pain for which he 
does not take any pain medication, but he does take 2 muscles 
relaxers and 2 arthritis pills daily. 
The applicant stated that other than on the day of occurrence, 
the next time the accident was mentioned was at a safety meeting 
held the next day or within one week, at which Alder was present, 
and thereafter the applicant did not mention the incident to anyone 
at the mine for the next 3 or 4 years. When the applicant had his 
first surgery in 1987, he took sick leave, and his health carrier, 
AETNA paid for that surgery. AETNA also paid for his second 
surgery but he guessed he was unemployed at that time. The 
applicant returned to work for the company between July, 1987, and 
October, 1987, at which point he said a personnel manager, Jack 
Casper told him not to come back to work. The applicant did not 
receive a blue slip, and did not file an unemployment claim. The 
applicant took short term disability under the company policy for 
a period of 13 weeks, then went on long term disability at $1400 
per month until the social security disability kicked in, at $904 
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monthly, at which time the long term disability was reduced to $510 
per month• This line of questioning was allowed for credibility 
purposes on defense counsel's contention that the company from the 
onset of surgery on, had simply treated the matter as one of 
disability rather than the result of an industrial accident, 
otherwise the applicant would not have been entitled to either the 
short or the long term disability benefits. On cross-examination 
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, the applicant stated that he 
had never told his family physician (of 25 years) Dr. Morgan, of 
any back problems until the 1987 surgery. The applicant also 
stated that he never went to the Castleview Hospital before that 
first operation. The applicant did not know who it was that 
referred him to Dr. Jackson. 
On re-direct, the applicant was referred to his statement on 
page 177 of A-l to Social Security concerning the accident, and 
then to the broad question of whether there was any other incident 
that he could think of that would have caused his problem, he 
responded in the negative. 
On re-cross, there was discussion again of the incident where 
the rock fell on the applicants back which was prior to this 
industrial accident. In a letter dated November 7, 1990, from Dr. 
Gaufin to Dr. Max Morgan, the applicant disclaimed ever having told 
Dr. Gaufin about the rock incident, and surmised that it must have 
come from Dr. Kirkpatrick's records. 
On re-direct again, the applicant stated that the rock 
incident occurred while he was working at the Soldier Creek Mine, 
that he suffered a hairline fracture of his left shoulder blade, 
and was off for 6 weeks. The applicant now recalled the incident 
as having occurred in 197 6, that x-rays were taken, no surgery was 
performed but he did have to wear a sling. He further stated that 
the pain in his neck and back from the 1983 industrial accident was 
not the same as that caused by the rock falling on his shoulder 
blade. On re-cross examination by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 
the applicant stated that he was paid his wages during the 6 weeks 
that he was off, but did not know whether it came from the workers 
compensation or from the company. He also stated that his medical 
bills were taken care of and that he had been to the doctor on 
several occasions in connection with that. i When questioned as to 
why he had not gone to a doctor for 3 1/2 years after the 1983 
industrial incident, the applicant volunteered that the prior 
employer had sent him to the doctor on the 197 6 incident. The 
applicant also admitted that he had not taken any time off work in 
connection with the 1983 incident. When questioned as to why he 
had not related to Drs. Kirkpatrick or Gaufin that his shoulder 
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bothered him from time to time, the applicant responded with, "why-
should I tell them that if it wasn't bothering me?". When 
confronted with the doctor's remarks that his shoulder did bother 
him, and were therefore likely accurate reports of what he had told 
them, the applicant again contended that what he had told them must 
have gotten mixed up. The applicant also admitted that although he 
had backaches previously, his back had never really started to hurt 
him until after the second operation. Despite that, in retrospect, 
the applicant feels that the 1983 incident had something to do with 
his back problems. 
In response to the ALJ's question of whether the applicant had 
any industrial injuries subsequent to the 1983 incident, the 
applicant stated, "no". Regarding an office note of Dr. 
Kirkpatrick dated August 8, 1988, regarding a new injury, the 
applicant stated that it was when he had told the doctor about 
running into a screen in the mine, which he did not report to the 
employer. The applicant denied any other back injuries prior to 
these 3, but when questioned about a report stating that he had 
fallen on an anchor, the applicant stated that it was a piloneal 
cyst on his tailbone, which he acknowledge occurred while he was in 
the service. 
On further re-direct by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund when 
questioned about having back pain about 6 menths before the first 
operation, the applicant responded that his first pain was 6 months 
or a year after the industrial accident but was on and off, until 
just a couple of months before he went to Dr. Jackson when the pain 
got worse. 
On further re-cross by the employer, Dr. Jackson's note of 
February 27, 1987, indicated that the applicant had left shoulder 
and neck pain, which the applicant admitted. Dr. Jackson referred 
the applicant to Dr. Kirkpatrick. The applicant was also referred 
to Dr. Call for arthritis. 
On further re-direct as to the 1987 screen incident, the 
applicant characterized it as "minor11
 because he simply knocked his 
hat off on a piece of screen when he got out of the truck. He said 
that he mentioned it to the mine foreman, but no report was made. 
As to the anchor incident, the applicant stated that occurred in 
1952. 
The applicant called as his second witness, Matthew Breniman. 
The defendant's Motion to strike witness's Breniman's written 
statement was granted. Breniman stated that he had lived in Price 
since 1981, and had worked for Beaver Creek Mine as a utility miner 
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for 5 years and one month. Breniman stated that he was with the 
applicant on the date of the alleged industrial accident, but was 
knocked off the vehicle by a cable holding up the structure. He 
was not injured so no report was filed. Breniman does not remember 
what the date of the accident was. He further stated that the 
applicant was pinned over the steering wheel by a cable over the 
mid-section of his back, [emphasis added]. Breniman stated that 
the applicant half way slid out and had to crawl down the fender to 
get off the tractor. Breniman stated that Alger came by and 
because of Alger and Breniman's supervisory job responsibilities, 
all three of them went out to fill out the report. In the mine 
office, with the applicant, Breniman and Dan James, the General 
Mine Foreman present, Breniman said he observed Alger fill out the 
report. 
On cross-examination by the employer, Breniman stated that on 
or about February 8, 1990, after having had no discussions with the 
applicant since the alleged industrial accident some 7 years 
before, the applicant contacted him and asked if he [Breniman] 
would write a statement about the accident. Breniman stated that 
he did not remember the date of the industrial accident other than 
it was before the 1984 Wilberg Mine fire. Breniman stated that he 
came up with the date himself and also the details that he wrote in 
his letter. Breniman again testified that the applicant was 
pressed up against the steering wheel by something from behind. 
On cross-examination by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, 
Breniman testified that they walked to the mine office, and 
Breniman may have suggested to the applicant that he go to the 
doctor. Breniman stated that he may have worked with the 
applicant occasionally thereafter. Breniman stated that he was 
laid off along with about 40 others as a reduction of force in 
March, 1986. Breniman stated that he, the applicant, and John 
Alger, all walked approximately 3,000 feet to the mine office. 
Applicant's counsel moved to have Mr. Breniman's written 
statement re-admitted into evidence since defense counsel had 
questioned him relative to the statements therein, and that Motion 
was granted. 
Applicant's 3rd witness was John Alger. Alger was born in 
Price, and had lived there for all but a couple of years, working 
mostly in the mines. He worked for Beaver Creek from 1980 or 1981 
through May, 1989. Alger was made aware of the industrial accident 
when he came on the vehicles, but no one was around them. Then he 
ran into the applicant and Breniman. When asked about how the 
accident occurred, Alger stated that he didn't spend a lot of time 
on that, but rather concentrated on the applicant, looking for 
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injuries. Alger assumed he suggested an accident report be filled 
out because he was the belt foreman. Alger testified that the 
report was done in the main office with the applicant and Breniman 
there. Alger stated the general policy was that he would have 
filled out the form, as per questions put to and answered by an 
injured party. And then the applicant would sign the report. 
Alger also stated the general policy was that he would have any 
witnesses sign that form [but neither the applicant, Breniman or 
Alger stated that witness Breniman or James signed the form]. When 
asked what he did with the report, Alger described a tray that 
reports were put in to go to the main office at Price. 
Alger stated, positively, that he held a special safety 
meeting lasting over 30 minutes, the next day to analyze the 
accident for preventative purposes. Alger did not recall whether 
there were any other supervisory personnel at that meeting, but was 
sure that he would have had to get permission from a higher 
authority to have such a meeting, which would have been either Dan 
Meters, or Dan James, because it involved taking 10 to 12 miners 
off the job for a half hour or more. 
Alger then stated that early in 1990, after the applicant had 
contacted him, Alger called the mine safety secretary, Kathy Robb, 
and asked her for a copy of that report. Alger stated that he had 
no response for two or three months, and upon calling her again, 
she said there was no report. 
On cross-examination of witness Alger by the defendant 
employer, Alger stated that as belt boss his chain of command ran 
to Dan Jones who was acting Mine Foreman, and then to the Mine 
Superintendent, although he could access directly to the Mine 
Superintendent. Alger stated that he could not remember the exact 
date, ie., '82 or '83 or '84, although he testified about other 
details previously. Nor did Alger remember what date, or even the 
approximate month he signed the affidavit for the applicant. Alger 
testified that the applicant had called him about six months before 
the affidavit date trying to get information. Alger very strongly 
stated that despite the company's inability to find anything 
concerning this accident, he had written the report of this 
accident, made further notes in recording'it as a subject of the 
emergency safety meeting held the day after the accident, as well 
as in two later safety meeting reports and other records. 
On cross-examination of Alger by ^defendant Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund, when questioned if it were not true that safety 
meetings were held not only in the case of accidents involving 
injury, but also when there were "near-misses", and that the 
witness did not know of any injuries to the applicant, Alger 
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responded that he [Alger] felt the applicant had some. When 
pressed as to whether he knew if the applicant had any injuries, 
Alger testified that he was sure he suggested to the applicant that 
he go to the hospital. He acknowledged, however, that the 
applicant did not go to the hospital, did not go to a doctor, nor 
did he miss any time for three years. Despite his earlier stated 
dual concerns about accidents as a Foreman and for safety reasons, 
Alger twice denied understanding that an incident of a "near-miss" 
variety which involved no first-aid, no doctor, and no time lost 
for 3 years was an "incident report" generated for the company's 
personnel and other internal uses to try to prevent other such 
accidents occurring with injury or fatal results, rather than an 
"industrial injury" report. 
Continuing on the Employers' Reinsurance Fund cross-
examination, Alger stated that when he came on the accident scene, 
he spent some time looking around for a body, then headed for a 
telephone to see if anyone else had any information and that was 
when he ran into the applicant and Breniman. Alger said the three 
of them discussed the matter, telephone calls were made to the 
outside to alert them that there was a possible injured person, and 
that if they (the applicant, Breniman, and Alger) didn't show up 
that maybe they were down there with a possible injured person. 
Alger testified that the 3 of them then walked out some
 3,000 feet 
which was level in part and "rolly-poley" i^n part, which latter 
Alger volunteered was one of the reasons they walked out. 
The applicant's case in chief was concluded. The defendant 
employer requested leave to file affidavits from company officials 
as to what their records might reveal. On the basis that was to 
be accomplished within 3 0 days, it was granted. Applicant's 
counsel then represented that over the month prior to the hearing, 
as good a search as possible was made and no record was found other 
than that generated relative to the March, 1987 date of injury, 
which the applicant stated at the beginning was not correct, and 
there had been no accident in 1987. 
Applicant's counsel then requested opportunity to respond to 
the defendant employer's affidavit, at which point the defendant 
employer's counsel represented the substance of the affidavit would 
be that all existing records of the Beaver Creek Coal Company both 
in Utah and Denver, were diligently searched and no record exists 
of the 1983 incident. The defendant employer objected to the 
written statements by Alger and Henry Smith, who did not testify. 
The Administrative Law Judge took that Motion under advisement. 
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RULINGS ON MOTIONS, AND DISCUSSIONS: 
At the end of the hearing, the defendant employer objected to 
and moved to strike the written statement by John Alger • Since 
Alger testified directly and was available for cross-examination, 
that Motion to strike the written statement is granted. 
The defendant employer also objected and moved to strike the 
written statement by Henry Smith, who was not present for testimony 
and cross-examination. The Administrative Law Judge in reviewing 
the Affidavit, observes that Smith was not a witness to the alleged 
accident, or any of the other matters testified to at the hearing, 
and his statement that he pulled damaged vehicles out is redundant 
of a fact not at issue, that there was a vehicular accident. 
Further, Smith's "Affidavit11 was simply a letter without benefit of 
notarization, and not even having Smith's address or telephone 
number where he could be contacted for independent verification. 
That Motion to strike is also granted. 
There are some interesting convolutions in this case. 
The applicant testified as to having no pains in his back 
previous to this alleged industrial accident, but did admit 
"regular11 backaches. 
The first application recited an injury date of March 6, 1987, 
was rightly dismissed for lack of supporting documentation on 
January 26, 1989. The clear statement on behalf of the applicant 
at the hearing that there was not a 1987 industrial accident 
further supports the appropriateness of that dismissal. The second 
application filed on May 22, 1990, and styled as an "Amended" 
Application, was not an amendment, but rather simply a new 
application. Interestingly, there are several references in the 
medical records to the applicant hitting his head on a screen. 
Later in the hearing the applicant stated that he had run into a 
screen in 1987. Also, even though the applicant stated at one 
point in the hearing that he did not report the screen injury in 
1987 to his employer, he later recited that he mentioned it to the 
mine foreman, but no report was made. Since there is another 
alleged incident of non-reporting by the employer, credibility is 
clearly an issue. 
When the applicant was questioned about £ report that he had 
fallen on an anchor fluke in the service, the applicant's response 
was that it was a pilonidal cyst on his 'tailbone, (which was 
removed at age 21 (pg 44) in 1953) , even though the medical records 
state that he hurt his lower back. 
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There is also the accident in question of March/April 1983, 
and on cross-examination, the applicant admitted that a rock 
dropped on his left shoulder previous to his employ with this 
defendant but stated that it was a fractured shoulder blade and 
didn't involve his neck* This occurred about 1976 while he was 
employed by Shoulder Creek Mine. There is mention of that in the 
historical medical records, i.e. Dr. Kirkpatrick's statement in 
1987 about the applicant having back problems for 12 years prior 
would coincide approximately with the applicant's date of 1976. 
There are no Industrial Commission records in the file as to that 
1976 incident even though the applicant said that his prior 
employer sent him to the doctor on several occasions, that he was 
off for 6 weeks, was paid and his medical bills were taken care of. 
There are other interesting medical notes such as p. 23.1 Dr. 
Kirkpatrick notes progressive spondylolysis in lower back and neck 
- L5-S1 severe spondylolysis and spondylolythesis. On p. 23.2 
progressive diffused spondylolysis of cervical thoracic and lumbar 
spine. On p. 25, Dr. Kirkpatrick states, "I consider the patient 
medically completely disabled because of his progressive 
spondylitic involving all parts of his spine (the doctor also 
mentions the applicant's anti-arthritis medication). 
The applicant often disagrees with Dr. Kirkpatrick's notes but 
selectively, i.e., he refutes or attempts to have thrown out those 
things negative to his case as communication or recording errors, 
etc. , while trying to keep the things that are favorable to his 
case. He did however, admit that he had a conversation with Dr. 
Kirkpatrick about his having progressive degenerative disc disease, 
and on page 31 of Dr. Kirkpatrick notes in February, 1988, the 
applicant and his wife discussed with the doctor the choices 
between continued employ versus disability, and it was the 
applicant's feeling that the company did not want him back. 
The applicant said the personnel manager told him not to come 
back to work, but the applicant did not get a blue slip, nor file 
an unemployment claim. He did, however, apply for and receive 
short term disability, then later long term disability, and is 
still receiving the latter. This is not consistent with his 
implication that he was terminated. 
The ARCO disability application dated 2/9/88 (p. 135 of D-l) 
recites only C5-6 spondylosis and disc disease with radiculopathy. 
(There is no mention of an industrial accident which would have 
sent the applicant applying for workers compensation benefits and 
foreclosed him from the disability). The applicant also applied 
for Social Security disability benefits on 2/19/88 and those 
benefits were ultimately awarded on the basis of the applicant's 
spondylolisthesis, severe disc disease, stenosis and spondylosis. 
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Dr, Gaufin's letter of November 7, 1990, p. 22, says, " . . . 
the patient reported that at that time he developed his problems 
when a rock fell on his back while in a coal mine and he had 
intermittent neck pain and pain in his back since that time. 
Approximately in 1984 he injured his neck when he had caught on a 
belt line which caused soreness of his neck, shoulders and arms, 
and the pain would come and go." [no mention of lumbar] Dr, 
Gaufin notes on p, 222 that the applicant's October 20, 1988, 
operation was for spondylolythesis. On p. 224, Dr. Gaufin 
indicates degeneration of the C4-5 disc with accompanying chronic 
cervical myeloradiculopathy. 
The applicant's testimony was that he was pinned with his body 
down between his legs, which is not consistent with witness 
Breniman's testimony twice repeated that the applicant was pinned 
over the steering wheel plus Breniman's written statement to that 
affect. The applicant extricated himself from the wreckage, and 
walked out some 3,000 feet over roly-poly surfaces and returned to 
work the next day. 
The applicant did not miss any work, nor go to the doctor for 
some 3 1/2 years after this alleged industrial accident. The 
applicant describes 6 months passing before he developed pain in 
his left neck, shoulder and arm, which interestingly is about the 
same area as was injured in the Shoulder Creek incident. 
Despite the applicant and his witnesses contention that an 
industrial accident report was filed, there is no Industrial 
Commission report of such an incident, nor is there any such report 
in the employer's records. Further, there is no mention of this in 
any medical records until 1987. There does not appear to be any 
claim to any other than the applicant's health care provider, not 
the workmans' compensation carrier, for any of the applicant's 
surgeries. There is no mention of any back problems to the 
applicant's 25-year family doctor until 1987. 
Likewise the applicant claims twice that the company failed to 
report his injuries, being the 1983 incident in question, and by 
his testimony, the 1987 incident, which his counsel later stated 
never happened. 
Witness Breniman, who was RIF'd by the company in 198 6 after 
5 years, was in the Administrative Law Judge's-1 opinion, groping to 
prop up the applicant's story. Breniman, stated that in his 
situation, although he was knocked off the vehicle by a cable 
holding up the structure, since he was not injured, no report was 
filed. Also, Breniman's version of how the applicant was pinned, 
as stated above, was clearly different from the applicant's. As to 
both witnesses Breniman and Alger, it is noted that neither of 
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these witnesses now work at the mine, apparently as the result of 
terminations or lay-offs, resulting in an anti-company bias which 
was clear by observation of their candor and demeanor. This was 
most evident with witness Alger who was not employed by the mine 
after May, 1989, was solicited by the applicant concerning this 
incident, and painted a picture of non-cooperation by the employer 
for a period of months after the request was made by him for a copy 
of the alleged report • Alger did not say that an industrial 
accident report was filed, just a report.; He further stated 
general policies of how such a form would be filled out and would 
require witnesses signatures. [No such witnesses' signatures are 
required.] Interestingly, neither the applicant, Breniman, nor 
Alger stated that Breniman, who was clearly a witness to the 
accident signed the form, nor did the applicant, Breniman or Alger 
state that any other witness at the signing of the form by the 
applicant, which witnesses would have included Breniman, Alger and 
Mine Foreman Dan James, signed that report. Alger was clearly 
antagonistic and evasive. 
Having reviewed the file, the extensive exhibits, the 
testimony of the witnesses, their candor and demeanor, the 
Administrative Law Judge is now prepared to enter the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. There was no industrial accident in 1987. 
2. The applicant is permanently and totally disabled. 
3. Neither the applicant nor his witnesses are credible 
witnesses. 
4. The applicant was involved in an industrial accident which 
may have occurred in 1983 or 1984, and resulted in vehicle and/or 
property damage. 
5. No Industrial Commission accident report was filled out 
because of that 1983 - 1984 industrial accident because it did not 
result in personal injury to the applicant. He was able to walk 
3/5 of a mile out of the mine, required nonmedical attention then 
nor at any time during the several years after, and then only for 
his degenerative back disease. The applicant returned to work the 
next day and never missed any work as a result of this purported 
injury. Buttressing that is the lack of any injury report within 
the Company; the payment for medical services by the Company health 
care provider (probably requiring a co-payment or deductible on the 
applicant's part) that in a true industrial accident would have 
been paid for 100% by the industrial carrier; the applicant's 
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request for Company short and long term disability benefits that 
would have been precluded if this were an truly an industrial 
claim; the Social Security Determination as a result of the 
applicant's degenerative disc disease, and the long standing nature 
of that disease preceding this alleged industrial accident in the 
medical records. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
In accordance with the foregoing Findings of Fact, the 
Administrative Law Judge hereby rules that the applicant has failed 
to demonstrate by a preponderance of credible evidence that he was 
involved in a compensable industrial accident in 1983/1984 or 1987 
while working for the defendant employer, nor is he permanently and 
totally disabled as a result of either of those, nor entitled to 
any workers compensation permanent disability benefits therefrom. 
Good cause appearing, the Administrative Law Judge hereby 
issues the following: 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applications under case 
numbers 88000837 and 90001060 alleging industrial accidents of 
March 6, 1987, and March/April 1983, are hereby denied and 
dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
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vs. * 
Beaver Creek Coal and/or * 
Cigna Insurance and/or * 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, * 
Respondents. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah reviews the Motion for 
Review of applicant in the above captioned matter, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-82.53 and Section 63-46b-12. 
The applicant filed a motion for review of the order of the 
administrative law judge (ALJ) on April 24, 1992. At that time, he 
asked for an extension of time until May 11, 1992 in which to file 
a memorandum in support of his motion. The ALJ granted him until 
May 17, 1992, and the memorandum was filed on May 26, 1992. The 
respondents answered the applicant's memorandum on June 5, 1992, 
and the applicant filed a reply memorandum on July 7, 1992. Since 
there was no objection by the respondents to the memoranda, we will 
consider them. 
The facts which are alleged by the applicant in his motion for 
review, and which are concurred in by the' respondents are as 
follows. On or about March or April 1983, the applicant was 
employed by Beaver Creek Coal Company as a general laborer. At the 
time, the applicant was driving a trailer, which was pulling a 
1,100 gallon water tank, accompanied by a co-worker. The 
applicant's job on that date was to water the roadways on the belt 
line to reduce dust. The applicant backed up to the trailer to 
reach the lower belt line. As he backed over the fault line, the 
tilt and rush of water to the rear of the trailer pulled the 
trailer back down and under the belt line. 
The applicant testified that his hard hat was knocked off, and 
he believed that the lower roller of the belt line pushed him down 
and pinned his body between his legs. His co-worker was knocked 
off the vehicle by a cable holding up the belt line. The co-worker 
immediately came and offered assistance to the applicant, who he 
remembers as being pinned over the steering wheel by a cable 
stretching over the midsection of his back. The co-worker does not 
recall the exact date of the accident, but fixed it in the general 
vicinity of early 1983. He does recall that t:he applicant crawled 
out of the trailer himself. The applicant testified that his back 
hurt immediately from his head to his belt line and his shoulder 
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was severely scratched. 
While the applicant and his co-worker were discussing the 
accident, John Alger, the belt boss, came upon them, and the three 
men went to the office to fill out a report, which the applicant 
signed. The applicant did not know what happened to the report 
from that point. The accident was discussed at a safety meeting 
the next day. Mr. Alger testified that he had made a written 
report of the accident, although one could not now be found in the 
company records. 
The applicant testified that he returned to work the next day, 
still feeling sore. Within six months, he began to have pain down 
his left neck, shoulder, and arm, but merely endured it. 
In the winter of 1986, the applicant sought medical treatment 
and was referred to Dr. Kirkpatrick who performed a neck fusion on 
March 12, 1987. The applicant was off work until July 1987, and 
returned to work until October 28, 1987 when Dr. Kirkpatrick 
performed a second neck operation. A lower back operation was 
completed in January 1988 by Dr. Kirkpatrick. 
The applicant's health carrier AETNA paid for the neck 
surgery. In October 1987, the employer told the applicant not to 
come back to work. He did not receive a termination notice or file 
an unemployment claim. He received short term disability for 13 
weeks, and then went on long term disability until he began 
receiving Social Security Disability payments. 
There was some evidence that in 1976, the applicant suffered 
a hairline fracture of his left shoulder blade when a rock fell on 
him while he was working at the Soldier Creek Mine. The applicant 
was off work for six months on that occasion, but no surgery was 
performed. The applicant denied having substantial back pain until 
the 1983 accident. 
The applicant's counsel stated during the hearing in the 
instant case that there was no 1987 accident as alleged in the 
original application for hearing, and the ALJ found that there was 
no 1987 industrial accident. There is thus no discussion of any 
such accident in the remainder of our opinion. 
The ALJ made the following findings: 
1. There was no industrial accident in 1987. 
2. The applicant is permanently and totally disabled. 
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3. Neither the applicant nor his witnesses are credible 
witnesses. 
4. The applicant was involved in an industrial accident 
which may have occurred in 1983 or 1984, and resulted 
in vehicle and/or property damage• 
5. No Industrial Commission accident report was filled 
out because of that 1983 - 1984 industrial accident 
because it did not result in personal injury to the 
applicant. He was able to walk 3/5 of a mile out of 
the mine, required no medical attention then nor at 
any time during the several years after, and then 
only for his degenerative back disease. The 
applicant returned to work the next day and never 
missed any work as a result of this purported injury. 
Buttressing that is the lack of any injury report 
within the Company; the payment for medical services 
by the Company health care provider (probably 
requiring a co-payment or deductible on the 
applicant's part) that in a true industrial accident 
would have been paid for 100% by the industrial 
carrier; the applicant's request for Company short 
and long term disability benefits that would have 
been precluded if this were ... truly an industrial 
claim; the Social Security Determination as a result 
of the applicant's degenerative'disc disease, and the 
long standing nature of that disease preceding this 
alleged industrial accident in the medical records. 
Summary of Testimony, Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Order 
dated March 26, 1992. 
The applicant argues the following in connection with errors 
alleged against the ALJ: 
1. The workers' compensation act is to be applied 
liberally in favor of awarding benefits and all 
doubts as to coverage are to be resolved in fa-
vor of the applicant. 
2. Credibility of the witnesses in this matter 
should not affect compensation. 
3. The decision and order are not supported with 
adequate findings and legal conclusions as re-
quired by recent case law and therefore are not 
supported by substantial credible evidence. 
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4. The ALJ confused the issue of medical causation 
with statutory reporting requirements. 
With regard to the argument that the workers' compensation act 
is to be applied liberally in favor of awarding benefits, and all 
doubts as to coverage must be resolved in favor of the applicant, 
the burden is upon the applicant to establish a prima facie case of 
accident, injury, and damages to give rise to a liberal 
construction. We agree that the applicant can receive benefits 
under the workers' compensation act if an industrial accident is 
shown, and there is a medical causation connection between an 
alleged accident and an alleged injury. 
The next issue involves that of credibility of the witnesses. 
The ALJ provides us sufficient rationale for his determination that 
the applicant and his witnesses were not credible. However, the 
respondents join with the applicant in alleging that credibility of 
witnesses does not matter since the respondents had no evidence 
contrary to the testimony of the applicant and his witnesses. 
Additionally, the respondents commendably go further and state 
unequivocally that the applicant and his witnesses were credible. 
Of course, the applicant has stated his belief in the credibility 
of his witnesses. 
In this case, the ALJ was acting as the fact finder, and 
credibility was very much an issue since the only evidence as to 
the occurrence of an accident was through the testimony of 
witnesses at the hearing. The ALJ did not have to accept the 
testimony of the witnesses as representing the truth if he had a 
reasonable basis for finding their testimony as unbelievable or 
subject to less weight based on such factors as bias, inability to 
observe the related events, or other motives of the witnesses to 
misrepresent the facts. Cf. Baker v. Ind. Comm'n, 17 Utah 2d 141, 
144-145, 405 P.2d 613 (1965). The ALJ does provide a reasonable 
rationale for his finding that the witnesses were not credible, and 
we find no fault with his judgement. 
We will, however, treat the respondents' concession that they 
could find "no lack of credibility in either the [a]pplicant or his 
supporting witnesses....11 as dispositive. The respondents as part 
of this concession also agreed that "(1) the tanker rolled 
backwards, (2) the [a]pplicant was pinned In the equipment, (3) 
[a]pplicant suffered no apparent injury, (4) [ajpplicant attended 
a safety meeting the day following, (6) a MSHA report was signed by 
all parties, (7) the [a]pplicant returned to regular work and 
worked successfully for four years thereafter." Answer to 
Applicant's Motion for Review, at 3. 
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When the respondents agree that there was no lack of 
credibility in either the applicant or his supporting witnesses, 
there is now no issue as to memory, truthfulness, ability to 
observe, or bias, among others, and we have only to decide what the 
testimony proved. 
The next allegation of error relates to whether the ALJ 
provided adequate findings of fact. The Court of Appeals has said 
that findings which amount to a single conclusory statement that 
the "applicant's various listed symptoms are not related to her 
work as a telemarketer at Unicorp" are inadequate. Adams v. Board 
of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep 18 (Ut. App., Nov. 5, 1991). We 
believe that the ALJ did make adequate findings in this case in 
regard to legal causation because he extensively discussed the 
testimony and evidence relating to legal causation, said why it was 
believable or not believable, and then made the following pertinent 
specific findings of fact: 
1. There was an industrial accident in 1983; 
2. There was no personal injury to the applicant from 
the 1983 accident; 
3. There was no industrial accident in 1987; 
4. Neither the applicant nor his witnesses are credible; 
and, 
5. The applicant is permanently and totally disabled. 
As a conclusion of law, the ALJ, in part, found that the 
applicant was not permanently and totally disabled as a result of 
either of the alleged accidents in 1983 or 1987. The ALJ did 
provide justification for his findings and conclusions, and he 
explained in detail how the applicant had failed to prove legal 
causation. The ALJ in Adams, supra, did not resolve factual 
disputes in order for the Court of Appeals to determine what she 
had decided. The ALJ in the instant case did determine 
specifically, among other findings, that no compensable injury had 
occurred, and he gave plausible reasons for this conclusion. 
Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah 1987). 
There were additional motions in connection with statutes of 
limitation raised by the respondents which were not ruled upon by 
the ALJ presumably because of the ALJ's finding of no compensable 
injury. 
The relevant statutes of limitation provided in 1983 in part: 
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.•.If no notice of the accident and injury is given 
to the employer within one year from the date of the 
accident, the right to compensation shall be wholly 
barred. If no claim for compensation is filed with 
the industrial commission within three years from the 
date of the accident or the date of the last payment 
of compensation, the right to compensation shall be 
wholly barred. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-99. 
Although the parties dispute whether notice was given to the 
employer within one year from the date of the accident, there is no 
dispute that no claim for compensation was ever filed with the 
industrial commission within the three years required by U.C.A. 3 5-
1-99, and the applicant does not deny the respondents' contention 
that he did not file a claim within the requisite period. 
Further, the statute in effect at the time of the purported 
injury provided: 
...Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, the employee 
shall file with the Commission, in writing, notice of 
such accident, with a copy to the employer; if such 
notice is so filed within three years of the time of the 
accident or within the time limitations provided in 
section 35-1-99, the Commission shall obtain jurisdiction 
to make its award when the injury becomes apparent. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-100. 
Again, the evidence shows that no notice was ever given to the 
Commission concerning the 1984 alleged accident. 
The statute relating to permanent total disability is U.C.A. 
Section 3 5-1-67. However, it is clear from Mecham v. Ind. Comm'n, 
692 P.2d 783, 785-786 (Utah 1984), that in order for the Commission 
to apply Section 35-1-67, jurisdiction in the Commission must first 
attach based on another statutory provision. For example, in 
Mecham the Utah Supreme Court stated, "Section 35-1-99 is designed 
solely to create jurisdiction in the Industrial Commission, and 
there is no need for any particular formality, as long as notice is 
given." Dean Evans Chrysler v. Morse, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984); 
Utah State Insurance Fund v. Dutson, 646 P.2d 707 (Utah 1982). 
Once jurisdiction is established, the nature of the claim dictates 
what statute of limitation applies. Mecham, supra at 785. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that a claim for 
compensation need not bear any particular formality. Utah Apex 
Mining Co. v. Ind. Comm'n, 116 Utah 305, 209 P.2d 571 (1949). 
However, in this case no claim was filed within the requisite 
period to invoke jurisdiction. Whatever form such claim takes, it 
must give "notice to the parties and to the commission of the 
material facts on which the right asserted is to depend and against 
whom claim is made." Dutson, supra at 709 citing Palle v. Ind. 
Comm'n, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284 (1932). Although it is clear that 
no claim was timely filed, the remaining avenue which must be 
considered is whether the written notice provisions of U.C.A. 
Section 35-1-99 were met. If notice was minimally given, then the 
jurisdiction of the Commission may have been invoked. We will not 
consider the third avenue which extends filing time from the date 
of the last payment of compensation since no compensation was ever 
paid on this alleged injury. 
The respondents/ agree that the "[ajpplicant signed a report 
of the event that day. . .If even though a written report could not be 
found in the respondent employees records. The applicant at the 
time of the accident said that he "hurt all over." This statement 
should have certainly alerted his employer that at the very least 
a potentially compensable accident had occurred, and it is 
reasonable to assume that the employer did make an accident report 
because its agent, John Alger, says that he did. 
The respondents make the statement that fl[n] either the 
applicant nor the [respondents] considered this as industrial since 
no injury occurred." We can find no support for this statement in 
the file. However, there was a MSHA report completed after a 
safety meeting the following day, and we agree that this safety 
report was not notice within the contemplation of the workers' 
compensation statutes. 
We conclude that a written report concerning the accident was 
completed on the day of the accident based upon the testimony of 
the applicant, and John Alger, the company belt boss. However, 
neither the employer nor the employee filed a report with the 
Industrial Commission. The failure of the employer to file this 
report cannot now be used to provide a defense to the employees 
failure to file. Mannes-Vale, Inc. v. Vale, 717 P. 2d 709 (Utah 
1986); Kennecott Corp. v. Ind. Comm'n, 740 P.2d 305 (Ut. App. 
1987) . 
The failure of the employee to file his notice with the 
Industrial Commission as required by U.C.A. Seption 35-1-100 is not 
essential under Kennecott since the necessary party to receive 
notice is the employer. Id. at 309. The purpose of the notice 
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requirement is 1) to enable the employer to provide immediate 
medical diagnosis and treatment; and 2) to facilitate the earliest 
possible investigation of the facts surrounding the injury. Id, 
The respondents admit that the applicant said that Mr. Alger filled 
out a report and that the applicant signed it on the day of the 
event. We conclude that based on these admissions the employer had 
notice. 
The applicant did not file a claim of any sort until September 
26, 1988 when he filed a claim for injuries allegedly occurring on 
March 6, 1987. The 1987 date is no longer in contention as a date 
of injury. The applicant "amended" his application on May 22, 1990 
to allege an injury in the March/April 1983 time frame. Assuming 
that the amendment was effective, the applicant filed his claim 
some five and one/half years after his injury. This was outside 
the three year statute of limitations imposed for compensation 
claims by U.C.A. 35-1-99, and temporary total compensation, 
temporary partial compensation, and permanent partial compensation 
requested by the applicant for the 1983 injury must be denied under 
this statute. There is, however, no bar to medical expense claims 
under this statute, and the issue of permanent total compensation 
remains open. 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-67 (1953) is the governing statute for 
permanent total disability compensation. The Utah Supreme Court 
has held that there is no statute of limitations under the statute 
in effect on the date of the applicant's alleged injury, and under 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-78 we have continuing jurisdiction to award 
permanent total disability compensation once jurisdiction attaches. 
Mecham, supra , at 785. Since we have held that Industrial 
Commission jurisdiction has occurred based on notice of injury from 
the employee to the employer, we must decide whether there was 
shown to be medical causation. 
The medical causation question is more difficult to answer. 
The ALJ found, the Social Security Administration found, and the 
respondents have stipulated that the applicant is permanently and 
totally disabled. With regard to causation, the applicant 
testified immediately following the accident that "his back hurt 
from his head to his belt line and his shoulder was severely 
scratched." He also said that he "returned to work the next day 
still feeling sore." He claimed that "within six months he began 
to get pain down his left neck, shoulder and arm, but merely 
endured it." 
The medical records show that the next report of the 
applicant's medical difficulty is that of Dr. Douglas Kirkpatrick 
dated March 11, 1987. In a letter to Dr. Richard Jackson, Dr. 
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Kirkpatrick states: 
"The patient says he first developed neck problems 
about 12 years ago when a rock fell on his back in 
a coal mine. He had intermittent neck pain that 
came and went, and then 3 years ago he injured his 
neck again when he got caught underneath a belt line. 
This causes a soreness in his neck and arms. The 
pain would usually come and go but then about 6 weeks 
ago it became more frequent and then constant." 
Further, Dr. Kirkpatrick stated that his impression was C6-7 
disc disease, and spondylosis with left C7 radiculopathy. On 
March, 1987 the applicant received surgery for C6-7 decompression 
and fusion with iliac bone graft. Dr. Kirkpatrick, the surgeon, 
found that the disc was quite degenerated. The post operative 
findings were confirmed to be the same as his initial impression. 
Operative Report, March 13, 1987. 
After hitting his head on a screen, the applicant returned 
with a "new neck pain", and because of recurring pain, Dr. 
Kirkpatrick determined that an MRI scan of the C4 to Tl lower 
cervical spine was required. The MRI determined that there was 
marked spinal stenosis at C4-5 with moderate central C4-5 disc 
herniation. On December 21, 1987, the doctor wrote that the 
applicant was to be admitted to the hospital on January 6, 1988 for 
an anterior C5-6 decompression and fusion with an iliac bone graft 
on January 7, 1988. 
On July 1, 1988, Dr. Kirkpatrick stated that the applicants 
lumbar spine X-rays showed a significant grade I L5-S1 
spondylolisthesis with associated severe disc disease and 
spondylosis. He also related that there was some disease at L4-5 
and L3-4. This finding was confirmed when the applicant was 
operated upon on October 20, 1988. 
It is clear from the medical evidence that the applicant has 
lower back and cervical problems. The' respondents allege that 
there is "no mention ... made ... of repetitive trauma from heavy 
work." Answer to Applicants Motion for Review, at 8. There is a 
statement from Dr. Kirkpatrick on October 19, 1988 which says that 
the applicant's past history was "noncontributory to his condition, 
except for long life of hard labor, which has contributed to both 
upper and lower spinal disease." History and physical report, Dr. 
Kirkpatrick, Oct. 19, 1988. 
Further, the evidence seems to show that his medical 
difficulties stemmed, at least in part, from a rock fall in 1976, 
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from a collision with a screen in 1987, and possibly from the 
accident in 1983. However, there is insufficient medical evidence 
which amounts to a preponderance of evidence, and which shows that 
there was a medical link among these events and the current alleged 
permanent total disability. 
Dr. Kirkpatrick, in a letter to the applicant's attorney, has 
rated the applicant with a permanent partial impairment of the 
whole man at "about 20% referable to his neck and about 25% 
referable to his lumbar spine or about 45% total." The doctor 
estimated that the applicant's disability "is at least partially 
related to his industrial injury of March 6, 1987, although some of 
his symptoms and problems certainly pre-date this event." Of 
course, the problem with his reference to the 1987 date is that the 
applicant admitted, and the ALJ determined, that there was no 
industrial accident on this date. 
Our difficulty with this case is that we have insufficient 
evidence to conclude that the applicant's current medical problems, 
and permanent total disability are medically caused or aggravated 
in part by one or more industrial accidents. The medical reports 
which have been entered into evidence fail to provide us with 
medical opinion which states this within the realm of reasonable 
medical probability. 
There is no basis on which to refer this case to a medical 
panel. We have been shown no conflicting medical reports, and the 
applicant has failed to carry his burden of persuasion. Based on 
the concession of the respondents and our analysis of the evidence 
which flowed therefrom, we will substitute our findings and 
conclusions of law for those of the ALJ. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant and his witnesses were credible based on the 
concession of the respondents. 
2. There was no industrial accident in 1987. 
3. There was an industrial accident on or about March 1983. 
4. The applicant properly gave notice of the March 1983 
industrial accident to John Alger, an agent of Beaver Creek Coal, 
on the date of the accident. 
5. The applicant filed a notice of claim with the Industrial 
Commission of Utah about the industrial accident of March 1983 by 
amending his March 6, 1987 claim on May 22, 1990. 
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6. The employer, Beaver Creek Coal, never filed a notice of 
the March 1983 accident with the Industrial Commission. 
7. The applicant had only minor injuries resulting from the 
accident on or about March 1983. 
8. The evidence was insufficient to show that the applicants 
current permanent total disability was related to one or more 
industrial accidents. 
9. There was no evidence that the 1976 rock fall was 
industrially related. 
10. There was no conflicting medical evidence warranting a 
medical panel. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The applicant has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that his permanent total disability is legally and medical 
caused by one or more industrial accidents. His failure to file a 
claim for compensation within the statute of limitations imposed by 
U.C.A. Section 35-1-99 bars temporary total disability 
compensation, temporary partial disability compensation, permanent 
partial disability compensation, or related compensation arising 
from the 1983 accident. 
ORDER: 
IT IS ORDERED that the order of the administrative law judge 
dated March 26, 1992 is affirmed. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any appeal shall be to the Utah 
Court of Appeals within 3 0 days of the date hereof, pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, Sections 35-1-82.53(2), 35-1-86, and 63-46b-
16. The requesting party shall bear all costs to prepare a 
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transcript-of the hearing for appeals purposes 
Stephen M. Hadley . 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Colleen S, Colton 
Commissioner 
Certified this A?^/Oday of /X^vv^w^ 
A^EST: 7 
1992 
Patricia O. Ashbfy 
Commission Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on August 10, 1992, a copy of the attached 
Denial of Motion For Review in the case of Clarence W. Denny 
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, 
postage paid: 
Robert J. Shaughnessy, Esq. 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 963 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-0963 
Mr. Clarence W. Denny 
P.O. Box 228 
Wellington, Utah 84542 
Erie V. Boorman, Esq. 
Employers7 Reinsurance Fund 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0250 
Donald L. George 
Administrative Law Judge 
Virginius Dabney Esq. 
350 South 400 East Suite 202 
•Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A 
Adell ButleV-Mitchell 
Legal Assistant 
